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COMMENTARY:
LABOR RELATIONS AND TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
WENONA T. SINGEL

Commentators:
Steven F. Olson

G. William Rice
STEVEN F. OLSON:' Professor Rice has suggested that I should go
first, so thank you.
I'm a partner of
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We are proud of the fact that we don't work for the other side of the
street. We represent only tribes and tribal interests, and have worked for
tribal sovereignty throughout the existence of the firm and throughout the
time that I've been in practice.

1. Steven F. Olson graduated cum laude from the William Mitchell School of Law in 1992,
and was admitted to practice in the State of Minnesota in October 1992. Before becoming
involved in the practice of law, Mr. Olson founded and operated several successful business
enterprises, and has extensive experience with entrepreneurial activity.
Steven practices in the areas of corporate law, government relations, gaming business law,
gaming regulatory compliance, commercial transactions, construction law, tribal-state taxation
issues, and environmental law as applicable to Indian tribes, with special emphasis on business
transactions including financing transactions of all types, corporate issues and litigation. He has
extensively represented tribes before various tribal, state and federal courts in litigation involving
issues of sovereignty, sovereign immunity and administrative law, and has successfully defended
tribal sovereignty and sovereign immunity before the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, federal district courts, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and in filings with the
United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Olson has been instrumental in negotiating and closing several significant financial
transactions that provided resources for tribal infrastructure, casino expansion, and water and
sewer projects for various clients, and has negotiated various contracts on behalf of tribes that
contained terms very favorable to the tribes. Among other accomplishments, Steven serves as pro
bono counsel for immigrants seeking political asylum in the United States, and is an active
member of Amnesty International.
In addition to bar association memberships with the Federal Bar Association, the Federal
Indian Bar Association, the South Dakota Bar Association, the Minnesota Bar Association, and
the Hennepin County Bar Association, Mr. Olson has been admitted to practice before the U.S.
District Court for Minnesota, U.S. District Court for Wisconsin, the U.S. District Court for South
Dakota, and the U.S. District Court of Iowa, as well as the United States Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the United States Supreme Court, and the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota)
Community Tribal Court, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribal Court, and the Forest County Potawatomi
Community Tribal Court. Mr. Olson also serves as an Appellate Judge for the Lower Sioux
Community Court of Appeals, and for the Prairie Island Community Court of Appeals.
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This decision by the National Labor Relations Board, as the presenter
has indicated, is wrong for a number of reasons. It appears to me to
demonstrate a trend that is occurring both in the courts and in the federal
executive branch to attempt to subject tribes, in the absence of express
congressional consent in the form of legislation contemplating that the
tribes would be subject to those laws, to what is referred to based on the
Tuscarora Rule, to laws that are general in nature, and by their terms apply
to all persons.
Ms. Singel is right, when you look at the Tuscarora case itself, it was
not about a law of general applicability. That case was about a very specific law that applied to a very specific piece of, or very specific pieces of
property in a taking that occurred under the Federal Power Act. So, the
dicta really needs to be placed within that context.
That dicta has been seized upon by a vast number of courts. The
Second, the Ninth, the Seventh, the Eleventh Circuits have all looked at
Tuscaroraand have determined that that is a rule that was set down by the
Supreme Court. That rule has never been affirmed by the Supreme Court in
any case.
Going back to the case that Ms. Singel was citing, the National Labor
Relations Board v. Pueblo of San Juan, which was decided by the
embodied panel of the Tenth Circuit in 2000, and then was heard en banc
by the Tenth Circuit in 2002. The Tenth Circuit frequently appears to be
out of sync with these other circuits, when in reality I would contend that it
is these other circuits that are out of sync with the Tenth. The Tenth really
has a grasp on fundamental concepts of sovereignty in Indian law and how
they apply in a given set of circumstances, particularly with respect to the
application of the federal statutes to Indian tribes.
The Tenth Circuit in that case, and I would recommend that anyone
who is a practitioner or who is interested in Indian law read the case
because in that case, the Tenth Circuit said that they disputed the Tuscarora
Rule and the existence of that rule all together. And they, to a certain
extent, chided the other circuits for applying what is not really a rule of law
in a way that doesn't exist in the federal context at the Supreme Court level.
They said that the Supreme Court in 1973, in Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, implicitly rejected or overruled the Tuscarora dicta and restated
the proposition that federal courts should tread lightly in the absence of
express congressional consent. It comes to a question of whether or not a
law abrogates tribal sovereign rights.
Now, I think that one can go further in criticizing the National Labor
Relations Board's decision than even Ms. Singel has, because Congress
must invoke an enumerated power in order to act. That's stated in
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McCullough v. Maryland, by Justice Marshall who wrote the Marshall
Trilogy that serves as the basis for much of Indian law today. Marbury v.
Madison is another case that stands for that same proposition.
The powers must be expressly given in the Constitution before
Congress can act. And that's Martin v. Hunters' Lessee. That's reaffirmed
by the United States Supreme Court as recently as 1995 in United States v.
Lopez. Or powers could be necessarily given by implication in order to
exercise that expressly given power.
Congress is given only one power by the Constitution with respect to
Indian tribes. That power is in the Indian Commerce Clause. The Indian
Commerce Clause is found at Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitution, and it is one part of the commerce clause, the other two parts
being what are referred to as the Foreign Commerce Clause and the
Interstate Commerce Clause, which most of us are familiar with.
Congress has invoked the Indian Commerce Clause literally thousands
of times to enact legislation that is specific to Indian tribes. In so doing it
demonstrates and evinces a clear congressional intent.
It does that by considering in the process of enacting that legislation
what impact the legislation will have on Indian tribes and what purpose is
intended by the legislation. The Supreme Court has said that the exercise of
the constitutional power that Congress invokes must be the limiting
standard by which any enactment is construed. Now what relevance does
all that have in the National Labor Relations Board decision. Well, there's
a tension in this decision between the fundamental constitutional precepts
that I just talked about and the Tuscarora Rule and its application in this
circumstance.
Once again, the Tuscarora Rule stated in dicta that a general statute
applying to all persons includes Indians. It's very important to note they
said Indians not Indian tribes and their property interests. Now, that was
derived from a line of cases that had to do with whether or not taxes applied
to Indians in specific circumstances.
If you look back at what was relied on for support of that proposition in
Tuscarora, it has nothing to do with powers of self-government exercised
by Indian tribes as sovereign entities predating the existence of this Nation,
and who derived their fundamental sovereignty from the fact that they were
political entities that were here before the advent of the Europeans on this
continent. So you put that in the context of fundamental constitutional
principles and what you have, when you look at the National Labor
Relations Act is a piece of legislation that was enacted in an exercise of
Congress's interstate commerce power. The Act doesn't contemplate
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Indian tribes at all. It doesn't mention Indian tribes. There's no mention of
Indian tribes in any piece of legislative history at all.
If you go back to the separation of powers, which the Supreme Court
reaffirmed in the U.S. v. Lopez case in 1995, and you put this in the context
of the application of these laws in which Congress has not invoked the
Indian Commerce Clause but has invoked only the Interstate Commerce
Clause, one could easily conclude that the Second, Ninth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits have usurped legislative authority. They violated the
Separation of Powers Doctrine. Because what they have done is stepped
into the shoes of Congress and said that these rules that are contained in the
National Labor Relations Act are going to apply to Indian tribes. Even
though Congress never said that. They have taken the legislative authority
of Congress, and they have determined the congressional silence constitutes
congressional action. And that particular congressional silence constituting
congressional action has been given its greatest expression in the second
exception that was talked about by Ms. Singel a moment ago, where if there
is some second exception to the Tuscarora Rule, that was articulated first in
Farrisand then is carried forward in Coeur D'Alene, the second exception
goes to congressional action. If there's something in the legislative history
that evinces a congressional intent to exclude tribes from the application of
a law of general applicability, then tribes will not be subject to that law.
That stands the principals of sovereignty right on its head and really works
to abrogate tribal sovereignty by congressional silence. Something which
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said cannot be done.
Now once again the National Labor Relations Board is part of the
executive branch. Congress has not acted to extend the National Labor
Relations Act to Indian tribes. So in this decision, one can easily argue that
the executive branch has usurped the legislative role and has violated
certain fundamental constitutional principles that must be adhered to in all
circumstances when we look at the exercise of power by the federal
government.
Where once again, as I indicated again before in New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, the United States Supreme Court said, and this is
a direct quote, "where Congress has not acted to abrogate tribal sovereignty,
or tribal sovereign right to exclude others from their lands, tribes retain that
right." Now if it you look back, the right to regulate has been defined in
Supreme Court precedent as deriving a lesser incident of the broader
property right that tribes exert, and the broader political right that tribes
exert, and is an incident of sovereignty. Tribes possess the power to
exclude. It's a power that states don't have. It's a power that the federal
government doesn't have, except with respect to those who are non-citizens.
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The tribal power to exclude from their lands any person they choose
has been reaffirmed throughout the course of Supreme Court precedent
dealing with Indian tribes and their sovereign rights. So if you put this in
the context of Supreme Court precedent overall, and in the context of what
it was that the National Labor Relations Board did here, really what they
did was take the sovereign power to exclude, and the lesser power to
regulate, from San Manuel without congressional action, and without clear
judicial action. I would contend that there is a more fundamental flaw with
this decision than just all of the points that Ms. Singel has made. And those
are all very valid points. I would highly recommend that anyone who has
an interest in this area of the law, and who has an interest in tribal economic
development read this article. It is a very, very comprehensive treatment of
the subject. Very exhaustive treatment of the case law, and a very thoughtful analysis. I would strongly recommend it. And the author has done an
excellent job.
But what the National Labor Relations Board has done is clearly, in my
mind, unconstitutional and will not withstand judicial review once the case
gets to that point. If it ever does. We are still counsel on the case in an
amicus rule, and we received notice two days ago that the National Labor
Relations Board in the Washington office has once again taken jurisdiction
of this case away from the regional office on the pretense that the tribe is
attempting to re-litigate the jurisdictional issue. So I see this as part of a
trend that's taking place both in the judicial branch of certain circuits, but
also in the executive branch. I believe that trend is going to continue and I
think that tribes need to look at ways in which, as Ms. Singel points out,
they can act not just defensively but offensively as well.
One of the ways that you can do that, it seems to me, is to carefully
select the fact patterns upon which you litigate, and try to create legislation
for tribes that will give you the fact patterns that are going to be successful.
We recently won a case involving the applicability of ERISA to a tribal
gaming enterprise. One of the things that we had done in the course of
representing this tribe was to create structures that closely integrated the
tribal gaming enterprise with the tribal government so that this sort of
distinction that's being drawn by the National Labor Relations Board would
be much more difficult to apply. We married the two as closely as we
could. We also created a very strong regulatory body and set of laws that
govern the operation of that facility. We implemented various labor regulations that would apply to that as well. The tribal laws required that the
individual officers of that corporation in order to have their compensation
approved, or compensation increased, to have the approval of the board of
directors. There is a doctrine out there in the context of ERISA that is
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referred to as the De Facto Plan Doctrine, which essentially stands for the
proposition that in those circumstances where an individual employee has
been presented information by an employer that would lead them to believe
that they are a participant in a benefit plan, the employer can't later
withdraw those benefits and say there was no plan. In this particular case
these executives had created plans, diverted gaming revenues to those plans
claiming that they had been approved by the board of directors. That
wasn't the case and the tribal appellate court, Judge Henry Butwell presiding, determined that these plans had not been approved by the board of
directors as required.
The case initially went before the federal district court in 1995, and we
had it sent back to the tribal court on the Exhaustion Doctrine, and went
through the tribal process. The tribal trial court determined that this de
facto doctrine did apply. Tribal appellate court reversed that, and then
about nine months after that reversal, all the funds that were held in what is
referred to as a rabbi trust had come back to the company and back to the
tribe. The individual participants who claimed that they were beneficiaries
of these plans sued in federal court the second time.
The federal district court, Judge Dodie presiding, sided with them and
overruled our motion to dismiss. We appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and
the Eighth Circuit determined that in these circumstances where there is a
tension between a federal law and a tribal law, and the tribal law involves
Indian gaming and the policies of Indian gaming are clear, to strengthen
tribal self-government, and under the tribal law there could not be a plan
unless it had been approved by the board of directors, then ERISA could
not even apply to determine whether or not those benefits that are protected
by ERISA would be protected in this case. [This was] the first case in the
country where ERISA has not been applied to an Indian tribe in this
context. But I think again part of the reason for that is because we had
carefully laid the groundwork for this through a number of years, and had
attempted to create both a legal and a factual context within which we could
prevail. At the time that we went before the Eighth Circuit, we had framed
the issues in a way that made it clear that if the Eighth Circuit decided this
case in favor of protection of ERISA applying to these individual officers it
would be defeating the purposes of IGRA, defeating the purposes of all of
the tribal laws that had been enacted for the implementation of IGRA, and
would be defeating federal Indian policy in the process.
I think if you can create factual contexts that set up that tension and
clearly articulate those in the issues and maintain those issues throughout
the litigation process, we stand a better chance of turning Indian law in a
direction that it needs to go. And I think that that's the outgrowth for the

2004]

COMMENTARY

practitioner of the National Labor Relations Act or National Labor
Relations Board's decision in San Manuel.
Thank you.
G. WILLIAM RICE:2 Well, I asked Steve to go first because I had a
sneaking suspicion that if I did I could do this. (Throws notes on table.)
First off I want to thank UND and the Law School, the Dean, my
former colleagues up here, for the invite. It's an honor to be asked to come
back, and I certainly appreciate the opportunity to come back and
participate in this conference. Thank you.
And it was also a pleasure to hear the discussions this morning,
particularly this last paper, because it does such a wonderful job of bringing
substance and context to things that I was thinking about ten years ago
when I was up here and I wrote a little piece for the Law Review. Basically
it said what brother Steve said here, and that is that when we start talking
about doing things to Indian tribes and tribal governments, we ought to
tread real lightly. With that we had some explicit direction from Congress.
And part of that I don't want to rehash, I know we're running a little
late and my time was up two minutes ago, but I'm going to take a little bit
here anyway. This is such a wonderful context piece and theoretical piece
that it's difficult to get up here and say anything other than go get em, you
know. Because it does really lay out a lot of the thought processes. And of
course Steve brought in the practitioner's viewpoint, so in a way it's kind of
freed me to do what I guess, at least I think I do best, and that's kind of
shoot off on a rocket to Pluto somewhere, gather up some moon dust, and
think about a couple of weird things, and try to come back with a plan of
bringing on something. So go with me on the thought experiment for a
minute.
Let's take this rule that the National Labor Relations Board has and
apply it to the University of North Dakota [UND]. Oh, my God. North

2. G. William Rice is Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Native American
Law Center at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Professor Rice earned his J.D. at the
University of Oklahoma. Prior to joining the faculty in 1995, he spent 18 years in private practice
representing Indian tribes and entities. He also has served as Attorney General for the Sac and
Fox Nation, Chief Justice for the Citizen Band Potowatomi Nation, and Assistant Chief and Chief
Judge of his Tribe, the United Keetoowah Band. He has served as the official representative of
the United Keetoowah Band and the Sac and Fox Nation, to the United Nations' Working Group
on Indigenous Populations, and as representative of the Citizen Potowatomi Nation to the
Working Group on the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Professor Rice, who
has successfully argued before the United States Supreme Court, contributed to the latest revisions
of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law. His teaching and writing interests include Indian and
Indigenous law, with an emphasis on the protection and revitalization of the legal and political
systems of Indian Tribes, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Law.
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Dakota just lost jurisdiction over its own law school. You had the audacity
to hire somebody from somewhere else to come in and work here. So
whatever the exception is in the NLRB that doesn't apply anymore because
now it's no longer purely an intramural deal for North Dakota. You've got
somebody not from North Dakota hired to work at UND, and the fact that
they've been moving to North Dakota will be irrelevant, just like it was
irrelevant that these employees moved in. I suspect to the tribal jurisdiction
because of course if you live close to your work it makes a much shorter
commute. So a lot of these folks moved to the reservation, right? Well,
okay.
My tribe in Oklahoma now has jurisdiction over UND employees and
the Tribe Owatoma Rights Ordinance applies to UND now. Silly? Of
course not.
I can't get up here and say something like that. But that's the rule that
we're supposed to accept. Somebody from off the reservation or from
another tribe or outside the Indian community gets hired and all of a sudden
here they come in to protect their employee from the evil Indians that did
nothing more than give them a job. Well, I thought of some remedies when
Ms. Singel was proposing them, but my mind would go a little bit crazier
I'd fire them. If we can't hire anybody but Indians, well, fire everybody
else. Heck with you. Then it will be intramural purely. Right?
I know what it is to live in a place where I'm the guy that's got the job.
Let's be real, you know. So sonny, and son-in-law, and nephew, and
cousin, and grandpa, they all come to my house. Okay? Now, that's no big
deal. That's just the way it is in the Indian community. I grew up like that.
Whoever has got the job they fed everybody else. You share. That's the
way it is. Okay?
It's no big deal. Nothing to brag about. Just life. Okay?
Until of course we got too much to share. Until more of our guys got
jobs. Until we get too much money. Because what everybody has to
understand in this context, what nobody talks about, whether it be sharing
gaming proceeds, or whether it be who gets hired or the conditions under
which they work, or whether they can organize, or anything of the others
things they did at Tulsa, it's the context of 200 years of federal policy
aimed at one or two things. You can bring it all down to description of the
Indian community and enforced dependency on federal money. If you
really get down to it, up until 1973 that was the federal policy, with a
couple of glitches along the way where they actually agreed that maybe
tribes ought to do something for themselves, namely the IRA, which lasted
from about 1935 up until 1953. So we had about fifteen years in there
where the idea was that tribes should rebuild their economic base and
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rebuild their tribal governmental structures, which the United States had
spent one hundred odd years, and probably more causalities out of West
Point than any other war that the United States ever engaged in, trying to
destroy Indian tribes and enforce dependency on the United States
government.
And now we are faced with a situation where two things happened, and
it's kind of interesting if you don't have gaming, if you don't do any
economic development, if you succumb to the forces that have been levied
against you for all of these years. In fact, if that generation of tribal leaders
is still in your tribe who believe that the role of tribal leaders is to go tell the
BIA what the people need, I grew up with those guys. That was their job.
They went and they told the BIA or the Indian Health Service what those
people needed, and that was the role of your chief, your governor, your
chairman, whatever the title was.
We still have those guys hanging around and for tribes where those
guys win, what we hear from the BIA is you've got to get moving. You've
got to get active. You've got to get involved in economic development.
You have to end up being self-govern[ed]. You have to get busy, guys.
Okay?
How dare you sit back and say, oh, the trust responsibility requires the
federal government to look after us, which is what we were taught for a
hundred years. And on the other hand if you do economic development, if
you do get out there and get active, if you are successful at it, they change
the rules.
I mean tribes have not had successful economic development
opportunities since the buffalo were killed, until gaming came along. And
every time we tried to find one that worked the rules got changed.
We found one that worked. It was call bingo. I don't know anybody
who wants to be the bingo tribe. Now we're the Pangolabango. I don't
know any tribe that thinks that. But I know lots of tribes wanted to use
bingo so that sonny could have a job. So that we could pave the road.
So we understand, what was term they used this morning, revenue
sharing? We understand revenue sharing. We'd like to get the road to the
reservation paved. We can buy the blacktop. We understand that, but if
you have gaming and if you get successful, the rules change. We got
successful and California tried to change the rules, and the Supreme Court
said nope, you can't.
And that's Cabazon. The Cabazon decision says why can't the tribes
do gaming. There is nothing preventing the tribes from doing gaming.
The interesting part is all this thought process about, you know, as long
as the state law allows. Well, California is a 280 state. Congress has
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explicitly made state law applicable to California. So of course, if the state
law allowed it, because if it was criminally prohibitory that was the Public
Law 280 rule. It's the state law of general application, and therefore it's
illegal in the Indian country in a 280 state. If it's not criminally prohibitory,
if it's only regulated, if it's allowed to be played by some people some time
under some conditions, in other words, not like a bank robber, you can't go
down and get your permit to rob a bank, then tribes can do it, and they can
regulate it themselves because it's no longer a state law of general
application. It's permitted under those circumstances. It is allowed, and
that was the rule that came up in Cabazon. In other words, we won the war,
for a minute. Right?
We have got an economic development plan that works. And in fact, it
was talked about as the new buffalo. And what happens? Congress rides to
the rescue of the poor states that these Indians are abusing. The states come
in and say we are willing to allow federal courts to talk to us and to tell us
that we've misbehaved in the compacting process, as long as the states or
the tribes have to compact with us to do gaming in Class III. We want a
compact between the state and the tribes, and we will give up our ability to
not be sued in order to be a participant in the regulatory process of gaming
in Indian country. And Congress bought it.
A few years later what do we have? Federal courts say they gave it up,
but now we gave it back. Tribes are again finding a way to take away the
process. And what we have going on here in the National Labor Relations
Board, in my way of thinking, is simply an extension of that process. It's

not always the frontal attack that destroys the ability of Indian people to
exercise true self-determination. It's often the administrative agency. It's
often not the casino that's charged or that's attacked, but the ability of the
tribe to control the employees of the casino that's attacked, which is exactly
what's going on here. Okay?
Now part of the reason for that is the federal policy of colonialism. It
has always been here, always been with us. It's this dependency that's
enforced. It's the destructive elements that are pushed onto Indian tribes all
flow to this same level if we get too successful.
If we get too successful, we're not Indians any more. If we're too
successful, we ought not to have reservations any more. If we're too
successful, we ought not to have any rights any more. We ought not to
have any treaties any more.
And folks, I think that that's the unstated agenda here. But that's an
agenda that we ought to take a hard, cold look at and see what the roots of
that agenda are. Because I'll simply say to you that self-determination,
sovereignty, that we all talk about, is not self-determination as we know it
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here in the United States. When we talk about self-determination most of
the time we're talking about the Indian Self-Determination Act. Right?
And that my friends is a glorified program management tool. And that's all
that it is.
Self-determination in the international sense goes like this-Indian
tribes have the right to self-determination. Everyone would agree with that.
Even here in the United States, Congress would get up, and in fact has
several times in statutes saying Indian tribes have a right to selfdetermination. They don't follow it up with the second sentence that the
United States Nations uses. By virtue of that right, they freely determine
their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. The key word is freely. It doesn't give you a right to be
successful, it does not guarantee that you will successfully develop your
economy or your society or your culture, but it gives you the right to make
mistakes necessary to move forward with what's best for your people in
your own views. Things like this National Labor Relations Act decision get
in the way of that. One, it is an intrusion all by itself into our capability to
freely structure our political status, [to] freely determine what that is.
Should there even be unions on the reservation? That's certainly a tribal
call. Should there be organized labor? Should there be right-to-work,
should there be all kinds of things, ERISA plans? All of those are tribal
self-determination. Every time some outside entity puts the tribe in the
dilemma of you must do this or you can't do that, and then on the other side
you usually get something else the same way, so that you're caught
between, you've got to give up something regardless. That is an impact on
self-determination. That is an impact on sovereignty.
The National Labor Relations Board's own position, and I'll just try to
wrap this up, simply by being here it doesn't have to be a matter of if it's
intramural or extramural or some other kind of mural. Okay? So I think
that we end up being faced by decisions like this with those dilemmas.
What do we do?
We have gone to great lengths to try and keep, let me put this nicely,
bad guys out of the casinos. Most tribes that I know of don't want bad guys
in their casinos, or in their investors, or in their money.
Congress has gone to great lengths to make sure that that does not
happen. They have given us great help, and I for one am very glad to have
an inside track to the FBI files, so that we can do background checks on
people we don't know. Now I know uncle, but I don't know this guy from
Chicago. Okay? And I know who uncle is tied to. I don't know who this
guy from Chicago is tied to. Okay? So I am glad to have those kinds of inroads.
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On the other hand, whether or not I do slot machines or table games or
paper bingo, that ought to be something that I get to decide. That ought to
be something I don't have to ask anybody. The state doesn't ask me, why
should I ask them? Does the state have to come and ask the tribe if the state
employs some Indians or some Indians live in the state? Do the tribal rules
apply to North Dakota because UND had the audacity to hire some Indians?
Which I praise them for, by the way.
But oftentimes, if you reverse the role and you apply these rules
backwards, okay, if you turn the rule upside down, if you will, and try and
bring it down and lay it back down on the ground, you can see that the
fallacies exist. And I think this is exactly what your paper has pointed out.
If you turn this rule upside down and lay it back down and apply it to the
state, everybody would believe [it] to be absurd. And I think you've done a
wonderful job of pointing that out, and in lots nicer language than I used.
Thank you, very much.

